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Abstract 
Questions of causation are important issues in empirical research on political behavior. 
Most of the discussion of the econometric problems associated with multi-equation mod­
els with reciprocal causation has focused on models with continuous dependent variables 
( e.g Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979) . Since many models of political be­
havior involve discrete or dichotomous dependent variables, this paper turns to two tech­
niques which can be employed to estimate reciprocal relationships between dichotomous 
and continuous dependent variables. One technique which I call two-stage probit least 
squares (2SPLS) is very similar to familiar two-stage instrumental variable techniques. 
The second technique, called two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) , may 
overcome problems associated with 2SPLS, but has not been used in the political science 
literature. First I show the properties of both techniques using Monte Carlo simulations. 
Then, I apply these techniques to an empirical example which focuses on the relationship 
between voter preferences in a presidential election and the voter's uncertainty about the 
policy positions taken by the candidates. This example demonstrates the importance of 
these techniques for political science research. 
TWO-STAGE ESTIMATION OF NON-RECURSIVE CHOICE 
MODELS* 
R. Michael Alvarez 
1 Introduction 
Many interesting aspects of political behavior involve dichotomous decisions. For exam­
ple, a potential voter decides whether to go to the polls on election day (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980);  activists decide to donate time or resources to a campaign (Verba and
Nie 1972);  and potential candidates decide to enter particular races in certain political 
contexts (Banks and Kiewiet 1989; Canon 1990; Jacobson and Kernell 1981; Schlesinger
1966). One of the most interesting and studied choices, though, occurs once a citizen 
has entered the voting booth, since in American national elections voters essentially have 
two ways to cast their ballot - for the Democrat or the Republican. While sometimes 
there are other viable choices in each of these examples, much of the empirical research 
in political behavior has examined binary choices. 
The practical econometric difficulties associated with dichotomous dependent variables 
are now well known in political research. Given that ordinary-least squares does not 
perform well when the dependent variable is binary, researchers now turn to either linear 
probability models or to logit and probit models (Achen 1986; Aldrich and Nelson 1984) .
In either framework, under certain assumptions, the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable is not an obstacle to unbiased estimation of model coefficients. 
However, researchers using these dichotomous dependent variable models have not 
made much progress toward including binary choice models in larger non-recursive models 
of political behavior. In fact, the prominent .examples of non-recursive models in the 
literature either have introduced surrogate variables for binary candidate choices (e.g.
Page and Jones 1979) or have resorted to least squares estimation of a binary choice 
equation (e.g. Markus and Converse 1979) . In only a few instances have researchers
attempted to deal with the problems of endogeneity in discrete choice models in political 
"'John Aldrich and John Brehm provided important comments and advice. The John M. Olin Foun­
dation provided support for this research. 
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science, with the most notable being models of party identification (Franklin and Jackson 
1983; Fiorina 1982). But even these models have not involved binary choices. 
In this paper I examine two techniques which can be used to estimate reciprocal 
relationships between dichotomous and continuous dependent variables. One technique 
which I call two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) is very similar to familiar two-stage 
instrumental variable techniques. The second technique, called two-stage conditional 
maximum likelihood (2SCML), overcomes many of the problems associated with 2SPLS, 
but has not seen adoption in the political science literature. The next section discusses 
the two models. Then I turn to a presentation of the properties of each model, by 
examining Monte Carlo simulations. Thereafter I show the applicability of both models 
to a problem of contemporary interest. 
2 Non-Recursive Two-Stage Choice Models 
I begin this discussion with a simple two-variable non-recursive system: 
YI = /1Y2 + f3IXI + µI 
y; = /2YI + f32X2 + µ2 
(1) 
(2) 
where YI is a continuous variable, XI and X2 are independent variables, µI and µ2 are 
error terms, I and f3 are parameters to be estimated, and: 
* _ { 1 if Y2 > 0 Y2 - 0 if y < 02_ 
From these, the reduced-form equations are: 
YI = 7rIXI + 7r2X2 + V1 
y; = 7r3X1 + 7r 4X2 + V2 
(3) 
(4) 
Within this simple set-up, a number of strategies could be followed to estimate the 
parameters of interest in Equations 1 and 2. First, if we were to assume that the usual 
OLS assumptions held for Equation 1 and the usual assumptions for the probit model 
held for Equation 2,  we could proceed with independent estimation of each equation. 
However, estimation of Equation 1 by OLS and .2 by probit would produce consistent 
estimates of the actual coefficients only by imposing tlie following restrictions on the 
model: 
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To put it in words, only if the endogenous variable on the right-hand side of each equation 
is uncorrelated with the error term in that equation can we expect OLS or probit to 
produce consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest in either equation. 
Of course, whether these assumptions are met in practice is dependent upon the 
substantive problem being modeled. However, there are good reasons to believe that 
assumptions like these are rarely met in practice. First, if common factors are left out of 
the specification of the model, and these factors influence each dependent variable, then 
these assumptions will be violated. Notice that this requires that we be very confident 
in the "correct" specification of both equations; if even one variable is left out of the 
right-hand side of each equation, estimation of these equations by OLS or probit will 
yield incorrect results. Second, if we do not correctly measure the endogenous variables, 
that measurement error can itself lead to the violation of these assumptions. Clearly, 
these two reasons alone should underscore the desirability of models which avoid these 
assumptions. 
However, two-stage estimation of models which avoid these strict assumptions has 
been discussed in the literature, with two different techniques advocated (Achen 1986; 
Amemiya 1978; Maddala 1983) . In the first approach, two-stage probit least squares 
(2SPLS) , reduced-form equations for each endogenous variable are estimated initially.
The reduced-form equation for the continuous variable (Equation 3) is estimated in the 
usual fashion, using ordinary least squares, while the reduced-form equation for the binary 
choice variable (Equation 4) is estimated via probit analysis. The parameters from the 
reduced-form equations are then used to generate a predicted value for each endogenous 
variable, and these predicted values are then substituted for each endogenous variable 
as they appear on the right-hand side of the respective equation (i.e. , Equations 1 and 
2) .1 Then the equations are estimated, with the predicted values from the reduced-forms
serving as instruments on the right-hand sides of the equations. It has been shown that 
the estimates obtained in this second stage are consistent (Achen 1986; Amemiya 1978) .2 
But, the estimated standard errors of 2SPLS are likely to be biased. For the continuous 
variable equation, since they are estimated by two-stage least squares, the standard errors 
can be easily corrected by multiplying the estimated standard errors by an appropriate 
weighing factor, as summarized in Achen (1986: 43) . However, for the binary choice 
equation, the standard errors cannot be easily corrected (Achen 1986: 49) . The asymp-
1 Note that the predicted value from the probit reduced-form is the linear predictor, f3Xi, not a
transformed probability for each voter. 
2The use of two-stage, or limited-information models, instead of full-information models, can be 
justified on two grounds .. First; limited-information models are easier to estimate and interpret than their 
full-information counterparts. Derivation of a full-information likelihood function for the model presented 
later in this paper yielded an exceptionally complex function, which made estimation computationally 
difficult (an example of the complexity of the FIML case can be seen in King [1989, section 8.2]). 
Second, full-information models, while theoretically more efficient since they utilize information in the 
data more fully, can be quite problematic if even one of the equations in the model is misspecified 
since the biases associated with specification errors will be distributed throughout the model. Limited­
information models are not problematic in this regard, since they ignore information about the joint 
distribution of the error terms across the equations, which leads to a loss of potential efficiency. 
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totic covariance matrix of the probit estimates has been derived by Amemiya (1978), but 
is exceptionally complex and computational difficult. Indeed, those in the political sci­
ence literature who have utilized the 2SPLS methodology have been willing to settle with 
consistent estimates and possibly incorrect standard errors, due to this computational 
difficulty (Fiorina 1982; Franklin and Jackson 1983). 
Yet it is important to be able to estimate reliable standard errors, so that we can 
conduct statistical hypothesis tests. The second estimation technique advanced in the 
literature should mitigate the problems with incorrect standard errors, and by using this 
technique we should not have to resort to ad hoc corrections of the coefficient standard 
errors. Rivers and Vuong (1988) developed what they term the two-stage conditional 
maximum likelihood (2SCML) approach to obtaining consistent and asymptotically effi­
cient estimates for the probit equation. This approach assumes that we are only interested 
in recovering the structural parameters for the probit equations.3 Then, to estimate the 
probit coefficients and their variances in the 2SCML method, we first estimate the re­
duced forms for the continuous variable equations, obtain the residuals from the reduced 
form regression, and add these residuals to the probit equation for the binary choice vari­
able as two additional variables with corresponding parameters to be estimated. Rivers 
and Vuong demonstrate that this method produces consistent and asymptotically effi­
cient estimates. 4 Rivers and Vuong also demonstrate that the joint statistical significance
of the parameters of the reduced-form errors is a robust exogeneity test. 
Thus, there are two different techniques which can be used to estimate consistently 
the coefficients for the binary choice equation (Equation 2) - 2SPLS and 2SCML. The 
major difference between the two techniques is that the 2SCML technique should pro­
duce standard error estimates which are more efficient than 2SPLS; both should provide 
consistent coefficient estimates. So; by estimating the binary choice equation using both 
techniques we may be better able to evaluate the second-stage probit estimates of pa­
rameters and standard errors . If the two methodologies produce similar results for the 
binary choice equations, we can greatly increase our confidence in the results. 
Notice, though, that the 2SCML model does not, by assumption, deal with the con­
tinuous variable equation. If we are interested in recovering those parameters as well, 
the only viable approach is to use an instrument taken from the reduced-form for the 
binary choice model (equation 4) and estimate the coefficients of Equation 1 with this 
instrument on the right-hand side (RHS) . Given that this is almost identical to textbook 
two-stage least squares, in subsequent discussion I call this component of 2SPLS the 
2SLS technique. 
3This assertion is not problematic, since it is possible using the usual 2SPLS method to obtain 
consistent and efficient estimates of the coefficients in the continuous variable equations. 
4They show that the 2SCML estimators are clearly asymptotically efficient when in the probit equa­
tion, the right-hand side endogenous variables are actually exogenous, or when the probit equation is 
just identified. However, their Monte Carlo evidence shows that the 2SCML estimator is more efficient 
than the other classes of simultaneous probit estimators even if these conditions are not met. 
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While these techniques for non-recursive choice models should be employed frequently 
in political science research, they are not. The 2SPLS estimator has seen limited ap­
plications in the political science (Alvarez 1992; Fiorina 1982; Franklin and Jackson
1983), while the 2SCML estimator has not been used in published political science work. 
Also, little is known about the performance of these estimation techniques, other than 
the Monte Carlo work in Rivers and Vuong (1988) . Accordingly, to evaluate the per­
formance of these two estimation techniques for non-recursive choice models, the next 
section of this paper presents the results from Monte Carlo simulations. Then, I present a 
substantive example of a problem in which endogeneity is suspected in a system of equa­
tions. The application of both techniques to this problem, focusing on the relationship 
between voter choice and voter uncertainty about candidate policy stances, underscores 
the importance of these techniques for political science research. 
3 Monte Carlo Results 
3.1 Experimental Methodology 
To examine the properties of these two statistical models, Monte Carlo simulations were 
performed. The simulations were based on 1000 replications of a 300 observation data 
set, the sample size being chosen to closely approximate the size of datasets typically em­
ployed in political science research. 5 First, 300 observations of three normally-distributed 
variables were randomly drawn.6 These constituted the systematic component (the X
matrix) for a simple two equation model:
Y2 = X1 + 2x2
Y1 = 2y2 + X2 + l .5x3
(5) 
(6) 
Then, an error term for the first equation (y2) was drawn from a normal distribution
with mean zero and unit standard deviation. An error term for the second equation 
was constructed by drawing another normal variate with mean zero and unit standard 
deviation, and transforming it with the following equation: 
Cl 
= 
..\(µ1) + N(l, 0) (7) 
where N(l,O) is the newly-drawn random variate, µ1 is the error for the first equation, and
c1 is the error term for the second equation. By changing the values of A I can simulate 
different degrees of correlation between these two error terms, and hence observe the 
properties of the models in response to varying degrees of error correlation. Each 
5The Rivers and Vuong Monte Carlo analysis was based on 1000 replications of a 100 observation 
dataset. 
6These three normal variates were distributed with zero means and unit standard deviations. All 
were generated using SST v. 2 on a Gateway 486/66. 
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observation of y1 was then recoded into a binary variable, depending upon whether the 
observation was above or below the mean value of y1.
Next, an instrumental variables regression for y2 was estimated, using the three in­
dependent variables, and predicted values for y2 were calculated from the reduced-form 
estimates. 2SPLS and 2SCML probit equations were then estimated for Y1, with the
appropriate instrument for y2 from the reduced-form equations substituted on the right­
hand side of the equation for 2SPLS or with the reduced-form residuals added to the 
RHS for 2SCML. This procedure, starting from the drawing of the first error term, was 
then replicated 1000 times for 13 different values of ,\ (producing error correlations rang­
ing from - .95 to .95), and summary statistics for the coefficients of these replications 
were calculated. 7 To evaluate the performance of the 2SPS model for estimation of the 
continuous variable equation, this methodology was altered. Each observation for y2 
was recoded into a binary variable, and a probit instrument was estimated from the 
reduced-form equation of y2, and this instrumental variable (the linear predictor of Y2)
was substituted for the actual value of Y2 in the continuous variable equation (here Y1).
This was also replicated 1000 times for the same 13 values of..\; summary statistics for 
the coefficients across all of these replications were calculated. 
3.2 Monte Carlo Results 
The results of the Monte Carlo simulations are presented in three different ways. First, 
I show the average estimated coefficients for 2SPLS, 2SCML, and 2818 graphically over 
the range of error correlations (Figures 1-3) .  Second, I give the mean square errors of
each estimator, which is a measure of the average squared distance between the esti­
mated coefficients and their true values.8 The mean squared error estimates are given 
in Tables 1-3. Last, I present in Tables 4-6 estimates of the average estimated standard 
errors relative to the actual standard errors of the coefficients to examine specifically the 
estimated coefficient standard errors of the three estimators. 
F irst, perhaps the most pressing question concerns the ability of the 2SPLS and 
2SCML techniques to recover the actual values of the coefficients in the binary choice 
equation. The relative abilities of each technique to estimate the true coefficients are 
shown quite clearly in Figures 1 and 2. There, the average estimated coefficients are 
plotted across the range of error correlations. 
7 An excellent summary of the Monte Carlo simulation approach is in Hanushek and Jackson (1977). 
Fishman (1986) and Mitrani (1982) demonstrate how the Monte Carlo approach can be applied to 
discrete data. The Monte Carlo models here were estimated using SST v. 2 (Dubin and Rivers 1992).
8The mean square error criteria has both decision theoretic and statistical interpretations. In terms 
of decision theory, the mean square error criteria can be thought of as a measure of the loss from using 
the particular estimator, or as the risk of using the estimator (taking the expectation of the loss). In
terms of statistical theory, the mean square error criteria is useful since it incorporates both the precision 
and bias of the estimator (Judge et al., 1988).
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Recall that the actual values of these three parameters are 11=2, /32=1, and {33=1.5. 
With these in mind, the ability of each technique to estimate each parameter is obvi­
ous. In the 2SPLS results (Figure 1), when the correlations between the two error terms 
is quite large (approaching 1 or -1), it is apparent that this technique does not come 
very close to the actual value of any of the three parameters. In these cases, there is 
a substantial negative bias in the 2SPLS estimates; the average estimated coefficients 
here are approximately two-thirds of their actual values. However, when the error term 
correlations approach zero from either side this technique does a relatively good job at 
estimating parameters quite close to their actual values. Last, only in a very narrow re­
gion around error correlations of zero does the 2SPLS model do a good job of reproducing 
the actual coefficients. 
But the 2SCML model (Figure 2) produces estimates of the coefficients which are 
close to their true values across the entire range of error correlations. The fact that the 
2SCML technique produces estimates of the model parameters quite close to their actual 
values, no matter the error correlation, does provide evidence for the utility of this model 
over the 2SPLS model. 
Last, in Figure 3 I present the results for the 2SLS Monte Carlo results - where a 
predicted value for the first equation was obtained using a probit reduced-form model, 
which was substituted in the continuous variable equation for the right-hand endogenous 
binary variable. As is apparent in Figure 3, when the error correlations are high (greater 
than .6 or less than -.6) the coefficient on the instrument (!) clearly has a positive bias. 
And this bias is substantial: at error correlations of greater than .8 or less than -.8 the 
estimates of I are inflated by at least a factor of 2. However for the other two coefficients, 
the 2SLS model does a remarkable job of reproducing the true parameter values no matter 
the magnitude of the error correlation. 
Next, the mean squared error (MSE) calculations give another way to evaluate these 
estimators. These are given in Tables 1 (2SPLS), 2 (2SCML) and 3 (2SLS) . We can 
directly evaluate the differences between 2SPLS and 2SCML with the MSE criteria. At 
extreme error correlations the MSE for the 2SPLS models are quite large and many 
times the size of those for the 2SCML model: with error correlations of .95 or - .95 the 
MSE for the 2SPLS estimates are about 10 times the estimates for 2SCML; with error 
correlations of .70 or -.70, the MSE for the 2SPLS are about 3 times the MSE for the 
2SCML estimates. But when the error correlations are inside those extremes, the two 
estimators are roughly equivalent in their ability to reproduce the true model parameter 
values. 
Next, in Table 3 we see the MSE estimates for the 2SLS model. Compared to the 
earlier models, this technique does a poor job of reproducing the coefficient on the RHS 
endogenous variable (!) in a broader range (greater than .45 or less than - .45) . Within 
that interval, this technique is relatively accurate. Also, it is again clear that the other 
two coefficients are estimated close to their true values across the entire range of error 
correlations. 
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The last set of results from these Monte Carlo simulations focuses on the estimated 
coefficient standard errors. In Tables 4-6 I present the magnitude of the average estimated 
standard error relative to the actual standard error of the average estimated coefficient. 
These calculations will tell whether the estimated standard errors are larger or smaller 
than the actual standard error of the coefficients; if the quotient is greater (lesser) than 
unity, then the estimated standard error is larger (smaller) than the actual standard 
error. 
The 2SPLS standard errors are generally less than unity, except for those in the last 
two rows (Table 4) .  Thus, the estimated standard errors in the 2SPLS model are smaller 
than the actual standard errors, although not by a great extent. The general pattern 
across the range of error correlations, though, shows that the quotient is nearest unity at 
high error correlations, and that it falls to the minimum at error correlations near zero. 
This is true for all three parameters in the probit equation. 
But a similar pattern in the 2SCML standard errors is difficult to spot (Table 5) . Here, 
the estimated standard errors (like the estimated coefficients) do not seem sensitive to 
the magnitude of the error correlations. Furthermore, the 2SCML standard errors are 
similar to the 2SPLS standard errors in that both are smaller than the actual standard 
errors. However, in both of these techniques for estimating the binary choice equation, 
it is clear that the estimated standard errors are smaller than the actual standard errors. 
The last set of standard errors to examine are for the 2SLS model. These estimated 
standard errors (Table 6) are quite close to zero, showing that they are generally much 
smaller than the actual coefficient standard errors. Additionally, there is a pattern across 
the range of error correlations where the quotients are closest to unity at error correlations 
around zero; as the error correlations increase, the estimated standard errors get relatively 
smaller. 
So what conclusions can be drawn from these Monte Carlo simulations? First, the 
2SCML technique does a better job of accurately estimating the model parameters than 
its rival, 2SPLS. This conclusion is warranted by the fact that no matter what the 
error correlation, this model can estimate coefficients closer to the true values than the 
alternative technique, 2SPLS. But, when the error correlations are small, the 2SPLS 
model does accurately estimate model parameters. Second, the technique for estimating 
the coefficients of the continuous variable equation (2SLS) is accurate in estimating the 
non-endogenous independent variables across possible error correlations. However, 2SLS 
does a poor job in accurately estimating the endogenous variable coefficient when the 
error correlations are large. 
Third, while the 2SPLS and 2SLS standard error estimates are quite sensitive to 
the magnitude of the error correlation, again the 2SCML standard error estimates are 
not. But all of these techniques under-estimate the standard errors of the coefficients. 
Clearly, when estimating these models in small samples, there is cause for concern about 
the estimated standard errors. This is a problem with these two-stage models, and this 
may necessitate the use of corrections to the estimated coefficient variances. 
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4 Modeling Votes and Uncertainty 
4.1 The Theoretical Model 
The substantive example concerns the relationship between voter choice in a presidential 
election and voter uncertainty about the positions of the candidates on various issues. 
First, as has been shown in the positive theory of voter decision making under uncer­
tainty, given the assumption that voters are risk averse (an assumption implied by the
assumption that voter utility functions for candidates are single-peaked and concave),
uncertainty about the positions of candidates on policy issues should depress a voter's 
utility for a candidate (Alvarez 1992; Bartels 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Franklin
1991) .  This is an important insight into how imperfect information influences voter de­
cision making, since the more uncertain a voter is about a candidate, the less likely the 
voter should be to support that candidate. Thus, it is critical for the positive theory 
of voter decision making under uncertainty that this implication be tested rigorously. 
Additionally, it is important to understand the variation in candidate uncertainty across 
voters in a presidential election, especially if we want to think about implementing elec­
toral reforms which make citizens better informed about the choices they make each 
election year. 
The two primary components of the model are a voter's preferences over presidential 
candidates, and their uncertainty about the policy positions taken by the candidates. 
Beginning with the former, the functional form for a voter's preferences when there is 
uncertainty about the candidate's policy positions can be easily understood using the 
spatial theory of elections (Enelow and Hinich 1984) .  So, the utility the voter expects to
obtain from candidates G and J is: 
E[UiJ] = CiJ - (PJ - Xi)2 - ujJ
E[UiG] = ciG - (pa - Xi)2 - ufa (8) 
where PK denotes the position of candidate J{ on a policy issue, Xi the position of the
voter, UfK the voter's uncertainty about the candidate's position on the issue, and CiK 
other non-policy factors entering into the voter's utility evaluation. If the election involves 
these two candidates, then the decision rule for the voter is simple: vote for candidate J 
if E[UiJ] � E[UiG]· Or:
CiJ - (PJ - Xi)2 - ujJ �
CjG - (PG - Xj)2 - uia (9) 
Here it is clear that if CiJ 
= 
CiG and (PJ - Xi)2 = (pa - Xi)2, then the voter's decision
hinges on the relative magnitudes of UfJ and Ufa· Thus if the voter evaluates the two
candidates identically on non-policy dimensions, and the voter is the same distance from 
both candidates on the issue, then they will support candidate J only if ufJ ::; ufa which
is true only when they are more (or equally) certain of J's position on the issue.
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The second component of the model focuses on the determinants of a voter's uncer­
tainty about a candidate's policy positions. Three factors account for voter uncertainty 
of the candidate's policy positions: their personal information costs, their exposure to 
information, and the flow of information during the campaign. Basically, the more costly 
it is for a voter to obtain, process, and store information, the more uncertain they should 
be about the candidate's position; the less exposed to information, and the less attentive 
and interested the voter is, the greater their uncertainty about the position of the can­
didate; and the greater the amount of information available about the candidates, the 
less the uncertainty a voter will have regarding the positions of the candidates (Alvarez
1992) . With these variables a model of uncertainty can be constructed under certain 
assumptions about the relationship between these independent effects and voter uncer­
tainty. 
Then, this uncertainty should directly influence the voter's evaluation of the candidate, 
controlling for other policy and non-policy factors relevant to the voter's calculus. The 
uncertainty measure is thus an important explanatory variable in the determinants of 
candidate evaluation and choice, as well as an important endogenous variable. This causal 
process relating uncertainty and candidate evaluation and choice is usually depicted in 
the literature as a hierarchical model (Bartels 1986; Franklin 1991 ) . This hierarchical
model can be shown as two equations: 
ViJ = /31 + /311X1i + /312X2i + Tu UiJ + 6i 
UjJ = /32 + /321X1i + f323X3jJ + T21 VjJ + 6i 
( 10) 
(11 )  
where ViJ i f  voter i's uncertainty about candidate J,  Xii are demographic variables, X2i 
are variables measuring voter i's information costs and exposure to political information, 
X3iJ are variables relating to i's evaluation of candidate J's policy and non-policy at­
tributes, UiJ is the utility or evaluation of the voter for candidate J, the f3's and r's are 
parameters to be estimated, and e' are error terms in each model.9 
Past research regarding voter uncertainty of candidate policy positions has assumed 
that ru is zero, implying that a voter's evaluation of the candidate does not influence 
their uncertainty of the candidate. Under this assumption, there is no reason to suspect 
a correlation between eli and e2il and therefore, the estimates of the parameters of each
model have the usual properties under certain other assumptions. But if r11 is not zero, 
then the two error terms are likely to be correlated, and the error term in each of the 
equations is likely to be correlated with right-hand side variables in each equation. As a 
consequence of this endogeneity, the estimates of the parameters in this model are likely 
to be biased. 
9The demographic variables ( X 1i) are in the first equation since I expect that two demographic groups,
minorities and females, might be more uncertain than others. It is possible that other demographic 
groupings might be useful, like income and socio-economic status, but these are concepts which surveys 
are not well-suited to measure. These same variables are in the second equation to control for non-policy 
and candidate variations across individuals in their candidate preference. 
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But are there theoretical reasons to suspect that a voter's evaluation of a candidate 
might influence the amount of uncertainty they have about the candidate? Assume for a 
moment that the situation is the typical two-candidate presidential race - under what 
conditions might we expect that voter uncertainty about the candidates is conditional on 
their respective evaluations of the two candidates? Downs, in his chapter "The Process 
of Becoming Informed," argues: 
Three factors determine the size of his planned information investment. The 
first is the value to him of making a correct decision as opposed to an incorrect 
one, i.e., the variation in utility incomes associated with the possible outcomes 
of his decision. The second is the relevance of the information to whatever 
decision is being made . . . The third factor is the cost of the data (Downs
1957: 215-216). 
Take a voter to whom the value of making a correct decision is quite high, and to whom 
the relevance of the available campaign information is quite high, but the cost of obtaining 
and utilizing this information is quite low. It is reasonable to argue that such a voter 
would attempt to minimize the uncertainty associated with both candidates, regardless 
of their prior evaluations of each candidate, since the value of being correct is high, and 
the costs are low. 
But what of a voter to whom the value of being correct is quite low, but the costs 
of information are high and relevant information is quite difficult to obtain? It is rea­
sonable to argue that such voters might be attentive to, or process, only information 
about their preferred candidate, and avoid or ignore information about the other, less 
preferred candidate. This type of process is similar to information processing strategies 
discussed in the political cognition literature - termed "top-down" or "theory-driven" 
processing by Rahn ( 1990), or schema-based processing by Fiske and Pavelchak (1986), 
or those described in the literature on how the media influences voter information pro­
cessing (Graber 1988; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Patterson 1980) .  In any
case, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that the uncertainty voters possess 
about candidates might be contingent not only on their information costs, awareness and 
attentiveness, and the information made available by the campaign, but also upon their 
existing evaluations of the candidates. 
Thus, there are theoretical reasons to suspect that r11 might be non-zero, and that 
a simultaneous relationship exists between candidate evaluations and voter uncertainty. 
This means that independent estimation of these uncertainty equations is inappropriate, 
and would lead to incorrect estimates of the coefficients in each equation. Rather, the en­
dogeneity between these two variables must be appropriately modeled so that consistent 
empirical results can be obtained. 
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The terms in the model can be expanded to clarify the general statistical model of 
uncertainty and evaluations: 
ViJ = f31 + f311Xli + f312X2i + Tu UiJ + 6i 
UjJ = f32 + f321Xli + f323X3iJ + f324X4iJ + 721 VjJ + 6i 
( 12) 
(13) 
where ViJ is the voter's uncertainty of the candidate's policy positions, Xii is a vector of 
demographic variables measuring information costs, X2i is a vector of variables expressing 
the voter's exposure and depth of political information, X3iJ is a vector of variables 
for policy-specific information about the candidate, X4iJ are variables for non-policy 
information about the candidates, and UiJ denotes the voter's utility for the candidate. 
Above, the voter's decision rule in a situation of two candidate competition was de­
veloped, and it was shown that they voted for the candidate with the greatest expected 
utility. Two changes need to be made in the model to reflect this. F irst, the voter's 
uncertainty for the other candidate (G) must be modeled. This is accomplished by sim­
ply adding another equation to the model for ViG. To express comparative candidate 
evaluations, however, I substitute a dichotomous indicator for whether the voter prefers 
candidate J to the other G, and add terms relevant to the voter's evaluation of candidate 
G to this equation.10 
These two changes yield the model: 
ViJ - f31 + f311Xli + f312X2i + Tu Ui + 6i ( 14) 
ViG f32 + f321X1i + f322X2i + T21 Uj + 6i (15) 
Uj* - (33 + f331Xli + (333X3iJ + (334X4iJ + 
731 ViJ + f33sX3iG + (336X4iG + T32ViG + 6i (16) 
where ViJ is the voter's uncertainty for candidate J, viG is their uncertainty of candidate 
G, x3iJ and x3iG are vector of variables for policy-specific information about each can­
didate, X4iJ and X4iG are variables for non-policy information about the candidates, and 
Ui* denotes the binary preference variable expressing whether i prefers candidate J to 
candidate G. Also, as before the (3's are r's are parameters to be estimated, and the Cs 
are error terms. 
Given that the structural model here is non-recursive, estimation of this uncertainty 
and evaluation model must be carefully considered. First, there must be enough infor­
mation in the data matrix to obtain a unique set of parameter estimates - in other 
words, the structural model must be identified ... Given.that-there .are.actually a number 
of restrictions in the structural model, the equations are overidentified, and given overi-
10In the empirical models below, this dichotomous indicator will always be preference for the Demo­
cratic candidate to the Republican candidate, where Democratic preference is coded one. Other measures 
of evaluation and preference are possible to operationalize from the survey data, but as I noted in Chap­
ter 3, the use of the "thermometers" is suspect. Also, "thermometer" ratings were not available in the 
1976 panel data. 
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dentification, instrumental variables procedures could be employed to produce consistent 
estimates of the parameters in the structural model.11 
There is a further complication involved in the estimation of the structural model. 
Since the comparative utility variable is a dichotomy - representing whether the voter 
stated preferring one candidate to the other - straightforward application of two-stage 
least squares, the typical solution to the problem of simultaneous equations, is rendered 
inappropriate. Thus I estimate the binary choice equation (Equation 16) using both the 
2SPLS and 2SCML approaches. The continuous variable equations (Equations 14 and 
15) are estimated using the 2SLS approach.
4.2 Uncertainty and Voting - Estimation Results 
In the substantive example presented here, I use data from the 1976 presidential election. 
This is a particularly interesting election to examine, for methodological and substantive 
reasons. Methodologically, this allows the use of the 1976 panel study of the presidential 
election campaign conducted by Thomas E. Patterson. This dataset, along with the 
accompanying data on the media coverage of this campaign, provides an excellent vehicle 
for studying uncertainty and voter decision making. 
Substantively, recall that Carter had been a virtually invisible governor before the 
spring months of 1 976; and before being appointed to serve the remainder of Nixon's term, 
Ford was a low-key House Minority Leader. Neither 'candidate was a long-established 
national figure, and neither was very well-known at the beginning of the campaign. Partly 
as the result of their relative obscurity, but also partly caused by lingering memories of 
Watergate, both the candidates and the mass media were largely preoccupied during 
the general electio:i:i with the character of the candidates. Yet this does not imply that 
matters of "substance", like their positions on policy issues like abortion, foreign affairs, 
or the domestic economy were ignored. The statements of the candidates were covered 
widely in the press (Patterson 1980; Witcover 1977). But Ford and Carter were extremely 
moderate in most of their positions, and typically there was little which differentiated 
them on public policy. 
Therefore, this could be an election in which voter uncertainty over the candidate's 
policy positions was exceptionally extreme, given two moderate and relatively poorly­
known candidates. So it is important to understand the determinants of this uncertainty 
in 1976. Also, it is reasonable to expect that this uncertainty may have strongly in­
fluenced voter evaluations of the .candidates. _Given .thaL.the...campaign was focused on 
character questions, it would also not be surprising to see these non-policy aspects of 
11 Below, when this structural model is operationalized for each election, verification of the identifica­
tion status of each equation is apparent through checking the order condition, which is a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition, for identification of recursive systems (Hanushek and Jackson 1977). The order 
condition states that the number of exogenous variables excluded from each equation must be at least 
as great as the number of endogenous variables included in each equation. 
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candidate evaluation looming large in voter assessments of the candidates. This might 
have been further exacerbated by the difficulties associated with distinguishing between 
two relatively proximal candidates. But policy differences between the candidates might 
also have had an effect, since policy issues were discussed in the campaign, especially in 
the two fall debates. 
In the next two sections, I present and discuss the two-stage results from the con­
tinuous two-stage equations (uncertainty) and then the binary voter choice two-stage
equations. Full discussion of the operationalization of variables used in these models is 
in the Appendix, along with the reduced form estimates. 
4.2.1 Determinants of Uncertainty 
The uncertainty models from the 1976 campaign are given in Table 7, which gives the 
independent variables in the first column, the estimates and standard errors for the Carter 
uncertainty equation in the second column, and similar statistics for the Ford uncertainty 
equation in the third column. The data used to estimate these models came from the 
October wave of the 1976 Patterson panel study. 
First, note that the models fit the data reasonably well. Both equations have similar 
R2's and standard errors, which indicate that the two-stage models do account for a good 
deal of the variance in the voter's uncertainty of Carter and Ford in 1976. Additionally, 
almost all of the estimates are in the anticipated direction and have standard errors 
sufficiently small that the estimates are reliable indicators of the population parameters 
at reasonable levels of statistical significance. 
The indicators of voter information costs in these models, the first four variables in the 
table (education, political information, gender and race) are all in the expected direction.
That is, better educated and informed voters were less uncertain of the policy positions 
of Carter and Ford in 1976, while both women and racial minorities were more uncertain 
of the positions of these two candidates. And only the estimate for racial minorities fails 
to reach statistical significance in these models. 
The rest of the variables in these two models, besides the relative candidate prefer­
ence indicator, measure various dimensions of voter attachment to the political world, 
and their exposure to political information. Unlike the National Election Studies, how­
ever, the 1976 Patterson data contained a useful set of questions which allowed me to 
incorporate three additional variables into these two models, which indicated whether 
the respondent watched either or both of the televisea debates, or recalled seeing some 
advertisement from the particular candidate's paid media campaign. So the estimates 
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for watching the debates or campaign advertisements allows examination of two specific 
types of exposure to campaign information.12 
Of all of these variables, only the estimates for partisan strength and the first debate 
indicators are incorrectly signed, but are not statistically significant. All of the rest have 
the correct sign, and most do reach reasonable levels of statistical significance. The first 
two indicators - media exposure and political efficacy - both show that the more ex­
posed and efficacious voters are statistically more certain of the policy positions of the 
two candidates in this election. Also, voters who watched the first debate were more 
certain of Ford's policy positions, while those who watched the second debate were more 
certain of Carter's positions. What is fascinating about these results is that they comport 
with both the information made available by these two debates in 1976, as well as pop­
ular perceptions concerning which of the two candidates had more effectively presented 
themselves and their campaign positions in each debate. Most observers concluded that 
in the first debate, Ford had articulated his positions on unemployment and the econ­
omy quite forcefully, and had put Carter on the defensive. Then, while Carter began to 
respond, the debates were interrupted by technical difficulties which most believed dam­
aged Carter's ability to get his arguments across (Witcover 1977) .  During the second
debate, both candidates attacked their opponent's foreign policy positions, which might 
account for the negative effect watching this debate appears to have had on the policy 
uncertainty for both candidates in the models. But the second debate was marred by 
Ford's "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe" comment, retracted within the next 
five days - which might account for the only marginal reduction in Ford uncertainty for 
voters who watched the second debate. 
Last, the candidate preference indicator is correctly signed for both candidates, but 
is statistically significant in only the Carter equation. The signs of these estimates 
indicate that the greater the likelihood of Carter support, the higher a respondent's 
uncertainty about Ford's policy positions and the lower their uncertainty about Carter's 
positions, ceteris paribus. But the magnitude of this effect is interesting, since it is 
significant for only the challenging candidate. This suggests that while voters do engage 
in selective information processing about presidential candidates, such strategies may 
not be necessary for incumbent candidates: voters may have already obtained enough 
information about incumbents to make selective processing unnecessary. 
4.2.2 Determinants of Choice 
Not surprisingly, the expectations about the role of uncertainty and voter decision making 
are demonstrated in the choice models. The results are presented in Table 8. Recall that 
12The debate and advertisement questions were included in the October wave of the Patterson study, 
just after the two presidential debates {September 23 and October 6). However, in the NES surveys, 
questions about viewing advertisements are not included, and the debate questions, when included in 
the survey instrument, are in the post-election instrument and hence are not very reliable measures of 
exposure to debate or advertising information. Consequently, I do not include these indicators in the 
1980-1988 uncertainty models. 
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the dichotomous dependent variable here is coded so that support for the Democratic 
candidate is the high category, and for the Republican candidate is the low category. 
Thus the parameter estimates express the relative effect of the particular variable on 
the probability of Carter support. I expect that the closer a voter is to Carter on the 
policy issues, the greater the voter's support for Carter (negative sign); the closer a voter 
to Ford on the issues, the lesser their support for Carter and the greater their support 
for Ford (positive sign). The more uncertain a voter is about Carter, the less likely 
they are to support Carter while greater uncertainty about Ford should lead to a greater 
likelihood of Carter support: thus I expect the uncertainty parameters to be negative for 
Carter and positive for Ford. The "better" a voter's evaluation of Carter's personal and 
professional characteristics, the more likely they should be to support Carter (positive 
sign) ; and likewise for Ford, where a higher evaluation of his character leads to greater 
probabilities of Ford support (negative sign) .  Last, Democratic identifiers should support 
Carter, and Republican identifiers Ford (negative sign) .  
In Table 8, the first column gives the names of the independent variables in the 
model. The second column gives the parameter estimates and associated standard errors 
as estimated by the 2SCML model, and the third column gives estimates and standard 
errors from the 2SPLS model. Notice that both models fit the data very well. Each 
correctly predicts slightly over 95% of the cases in the sample, and the x2 statistic for
each model shows that the models perform vastly better than a null, intercept-only 
model. 13 Furthermore, the variables of interest are all correctly signed and statistically 
significant at reasonable levels. 
First, in both models, the effects of uncertainty are correctly signed, and are estimated 
relatively precisely. That is, the more uncertain a voter was of Carter, the lower the 
probability they would support Carter; the more uncertain a voter was of Ford, the 
lower the probability they would support Ford. This finding directly supports the first 
hypothesis advanced by the spatial model briefly discussed above. 
13Neither of these goodness-of-fit statistics, however, are strong indicators of fit. The percent correctly 
predicted is strongly influenced by the distribution of high and low cases - when there are many high 
cases (say 80% of the cases are in the high category), the model will "correctly" predict better than when 
there are roughly similar frequencies of high and low cases. An alternative criterion is the "proportional 
reduction in error" (Hildebrand et al. 1976). Here, a simple PRE measure would be the model's 
prediction rate relative to a naive prediction rate, the percentage falling into the modal category. In the 
1976 data, the modal category was Carter support (53.9%). By this criteria, the 2SCML model predicts
41.4% better and the 2SPLS model predicts 41.8% better than the naive model. The x2 statistic reported
here is twice the difference between the log-likelihood of a naive model (with only an intercept included) 
and the log-likelihood of the actual models, often called the model's "deviance function" (McCullagh
and Nelder 1991 ) . The difference between log-likelihoods is.often claimed to be distributed as a x2, with
degrees-of-freedom equal to the number of restrictions. In the 2SCML model there are 11 degrees-of­
freedom, and 9 in the 2SPLS model, making the x2 for each model highly significant. But the claim
that the difference in log-likelihoods is approximated by a x2 is contingent upon the observations being
distributed independently according to the binomial distribution, and upon the number of observations 
being small. Thus as n increases, the approximation breaks down, and large differences will be observed
(McCullagh and Nelder 1991). With these caveats in mind, I report percent correctly predicted and x2 
statistics. 
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Worthy of additional notice, though, is the observation that the effects of policy un­
certainty were greater for Carter uncertainty than for Ford uncertainty. In other words, 
the voter's uncertainty for Carter's positions had a greater effect on which candidate 
the voter supported than the voter's uncertainty of Ford's positions. These differential 
effects are probably the result of greater uncertainty about the positions of Carter, who 
was somewhat less visible before the general election began, and who did not have the 
tools of an incumbent president to make his policy positions known to the electorate. 
Relatedly, the estimates for the effects of policy issues upon candidate support in 
1976 support this argument. Both squared issue distance terms are correctly signed, yet 
the estimate for Carter issue distance is statistically significant at only the p=0.10 level, 
while the similar estimate for Ford issue distance is estimated more precisely (p=0.05).
But the effect of issues is greater for Ford than for Carter, as witnessed by the relative 
sizes of the coefficients for Ford issue distance. With more uncertainty about Carter's 
positions, and with Carter uncertainty having more of an effect on candidate support, it 
is not surprising that Carter's positions on the issues had less of an influence on voter 
evaluations of the candidates in 1976. 
The other two sets of parameters of interest - the non-policy dimensions of candidate 
evaluations - are all correctly signed and precisely estimated. That is, the partisan 
affiliation of the voter clearly influenced their evaluations of Ford and Carter. Also, 
their assessments of the characters of the candidates influenced their evaluations, with 
higher evaluations of either candidate's personal and professional characteristics leading 
to greater support for the candidate. But it is interesting to note that here again, the 
effect of candidate characteristics on candidate support is greater for Ford than for Carter. 
Perhaps the decision by Ford and his advisors to focus on the "character issue" and to 
employ the "Rose Garden strategy" had some effect on the electorate, leading to more 
positive assessments of his character than for Carter. 
Lastly, there are the two parameters from the reduced-form regressions for both Ford 
and Carter uncertainty (presented in the appendix) , presented for the 2SCML model.
Recall the discussion of these two parameters from above: Rivers and Vuong (1988) 
demonstrate that these parameters give a robust test of exogeneity. The two parameters 
are larger than their standard errors, but the relative magnitudes of the parameters to 
their standard errors are not great enough for the parameters to be considered statistically 
significant. But, the deviance function for the 2SCML model versus a similar model 
without these two parameters yields a x2 of 10.88, which is is larger than the critical value
of 5.99 at 2 degrees of freedom. Therefore, endogeneity between candidate evaluation 
and voter policy-uncertainty is evident, and needs to -be accounted for in these models. 
However, what is the magnitude of the estimated effects of these variables upon can­
didate evaluations in 1976? As is usually the case in non-linear probit models, the 
parameters in the evaluation models cannot be interpreted directly, since the models are 
non-linear and the effect of any particular variable on the probability of supporting one 
candidate is dependent on the values of the other variables and parameters in the model. 
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To give a more intuitive feel for the magnitude of two of the effects in the models, of 
candidate uncertainty and squared policy issue distance upon candidate support, I uti­
lize graphical methods (King 1989; McCullagh and Nelder 1991).14 The results for the
candidate policy uncertainty parameters are graphed in Figure 4. 
In F igure 4 the voter's uncertainty about each candidate's policy positions is graphed 
along the x-axis, and the probability that the voter would support Carter on the y-axis. 
The dark line gives the effect of Ford policy uncertainty on probability of Carter support, 
while the light line gives the effect of Carter policy uncertainty on the probability the 
voter would support Carter (holding the other variables constant at their sample mean
values) . The strong effect of uncertainty on candidate evaluation is clear in this graph.
Take two identical voters, with "mean" values on all the variables, but one who is very 
certain of Carter's position on the issues (1) and the other who is relatively uncertain of 
Carter's positions (5) . The graph indicates that the former voter - the relatively certain 
voter - has a very high probability of supporting Carter, while the uncertain voter is 
slightly less than 50% likely to support Carter. Thus, by changing the relative uncertainty 
of the voter from very certain to relatively uncertain, the probability of supporting Carter 
in 1976 changes by over 50%. 
To examine the relative impacts of these two variables, note that both Ford and Carter 
uncertainty had roughly similar distributions: the uncertainty means (3.96 for Ford, 4.08 
for Carter) and standard deviations (3. 03 for Ford, and 3.07 for Carter) . Under the
assumption that these two variables are normally distributed, we would expect that 
65% of the sample would have had uncertainty for both candidates within one standard 
deviation of the mean: roughly ranging from 1 to 7 .15 Across this range, it is apparent 
that Carter uncertainty does have a marginally larger impact of candidate evaluation 
than Ford uncertainty: there is a 95% change in probability of Carter support across this
range of Carter uncertainty, and a 92% change in the same range for Ford uncertainty. 
5 Discussion 
This substantive example should make clear the importance of non-recursive choice mod­
els in political science. The theoretical model connecting voter preferences for candidates 
with their uncertainty about the candidates shows the endogeneity of these two factors, 
14Graphical methods involve simple simulations using the parameters of the model and some combi­
nation of values of the independent variables. Here, I set all but one of the independent variables to 
their mean values in the .sample of-voters used to estimate the model {the -descriptive statistics are in 
the appendix). Then, I vary the one variable of interest across a range of values the variable takes in the 
actual data. This produces an estimate of the linear predictor for each value of the variable of interest, 
which is then transformed into a probability by the use of the appropriate link function. In each of the 
graphical interpretations here, I use the parameters from the 2SPLS model. 
15 As I will show in subsequent chapters, though, the distributions of uncertainty for the presidential 
candidates examined in this dissertation are not normally distributed. In fact, they are by definition 
bounded on the left by zero {a variance or standard deviation is, by definition, positive), with a long tail 
to the left . I only mention the normal distribution in this context for convenience. 
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a point which has not been taken into consideration in past research on either topic. The 
empirical estimation of this non-recursive model demonstrates the inter-relation of pref­
erences and uncertainty, and in so doing, produces interesting insights into the politics 
of presidential campaigns (Alvarez 1992) .
As a research methodology, then, these two-stage models of binary and continuous 
variables have great promise. But the Monte Carlo evidence presented earlier in this 
paper shows that these models do have some troubling properties; while the 2SCML 
model does estimate the true values of the parameters accurately, it tends to understate 
the actual uncertainty inherent in these estimates. The 2SPLS and 2SLS models both 
estimate the coefficients relatively well when error correlations are modest; but with 
greater error correlations each produces estimates further from the true values. These 
two-stage non-recursive choice models are quite easy to estimate. In fact, they take no 
longer to estimate than recursive specifications. 
Thus, a when faced with a substantive problem which involves a non-recursive set 
of binary and continuous variable equations, an appropriate methodology would include 
estimating and presenting both the 2SPLS and 2SCML estimates for the binary variable 
equation(s) . As the Monte Carlo results made quite evident, under some conditions
the 2SPLS technique alone may yield incorrect results. With well-specified theoretical 
models and correctly measured RHS variables, thought, it is likely that the error term 
correlations will not be in the extreme ranges and both techniques can produce quite 
similar results. That this occurred in the empirical example presented above indicates 
that by verifying the estimated results from one technique against another we can be 
much more confident in our results. 
With these considerations in mind, more work on similar two-stage techniques is 
needed. In particular, there has been no work on non-recursive models involving discrete 
choice variables - whether the discrete variables are ordered or unordered. Even though 
some researchers have employed two-stage techniques to estimate models involving such 
variables (Fiorina 1982; Franklin and Jackson 1983) , almost nothing is known about the
properties of models involving discrete choice variables. Expanding our knowledge of 
these models is important for empirical political science research. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Operationalizations of Variables 
The coding of the variables from the 1976 Patterson panel study is complicated by the 
fact that the ICPSR documentation for the study contains no variable numbers. Conse­
quently, I assigned variable numbers to the ICPSR codebook (ICPSR study 7990, First
Edition, 1982) sequentially (question 1, page 1, "location number" is V l ,  while the last 
codebook entry for "weight factor" on page 195 is the last variable, V1664). 
In the uncertainty equation, the following variables were used. The variable for edu­
cation was taken from V9,  and was coded: 1 for those with a grade-school education or 
less; 2 for those with a high school education; 3 for those with some college or vocational 
education; 4 for those with college degrees. Political information is a ten-point scale 
where the respondent was given a point for each time both parties were placed and the 
Democratic party was placed to the "left" of the Republican party on the seven-point 
issue and ideology scales. Gender and Race are dummy indicators, where Gender is 1 for 
females and 0 for males (from V21) , and race is 1 for minorities and 0 for whites (from
V24). Partisan strength is the folded partisan identification scale (V1569). Media expo­
sure was constructed as a factor scale from variables measuring the regularity with which 
the respondent was exposed to news coverage in newspapers (V1328) , news magazines 
(V1339) ,  television news (V1358) , and conversations with others (V1348) .  The princi­
pal components factor analysis yielded one factor, eigenvalue 8.37. The political efficacy 
variable is an index of external political efficacy from questions concerning big interests 
and government (V1575), faith and confidence in government (V1577) , public officials 
and people like me (V1579) .  A principal components factor analysis was used to make 
a factor scale; the eigenvalue of the only factor extracted from the data was 2.80. The 
indicators for the first and second debates, and for whether the voter saw a candidate's 
advertisement are dummy indicators, from V1455, V1456 (for the debates) and V1386,
V1393 (for candidate advertisements. Nine seven-point issue scales are available in this
survey: government provision of employment, involvement in the internal affairs of other 
nations, wage and price controls, defense spending, social welfare spending, tax cuts, 
legalized abortion, crime, and busing. The uncertainty variable was constructed by sub­
tracting the respondent's placement of the candidate on the issue from the candidate's 
position, where the latter was measured by the mean position across all respondents 
placing the candidate on the issue. Respondents who did not place the candidate were 
assumed to be maximally uncertain about the candidate's position. 
In the voting choice-equation,--the candidate traits variables-were taken from questions 
in the Patterson study asking respondents to rate the attractiveness of the candidate's 
personality . (V1426, V1427) ,  their leadership abilities (V1431, V1432) , their trustwor­
thiness (V1436, V1437) ,  and their ability or competence (V1441, V1442) ,  for Ford and 
Carter respectively. Factor scales were constructed of these items for each candidate, 
with eigenvalues of 11.5 (Ford) and 8.28 (Carter) . All of the available seven-point is­
sue scales were used to calculate the uncertainty and squared issue distance terms (with
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the candidate means employed in the latter variable for the position of the candidates).
Party identification came from the standard seven-point scale (V l569). The dichotomous 
candidate preference variable came from the post-election interview question as to whom 
the respondent had vote for (V1614), and was coded 1 for a Carter vote. 
The measure of voter uncertainty about candidate policy positions comes from Alvarez 
(1992) .  It is based upon a statistical notion of uncertainty, where the "spread" of points 
around a central tendency is commonly defined for a mean as u2 = � I:�=l ( x -x)2 , where
x denotes the n points in the sample, and x represents the mean value, or the central 
tendency, in x. With this representation in mind, consider: 
1 K VjJ = k E(PiJk - TJk)2
k=l 
(17) 
where ViJ represents the voter i's uncertainty in their placement of J, PiJk gives i's 
placement of J on each of the relevant k policy dimensions, and TJk indicates the position 
of candidate J on policy dimension k. 
Less technically, this is a representation of the voter's uncertainty about the can­
didate's position across the policy space, in terms of the net dispersion of the voter's 
perception of the candidate's position and the candidate's true position. The greater 
the dispersion of their perceptions of the candidate's position from the candidate's true 
position, the more uncertain they are about the candidate's position on the policy issues; 
the tighter this dispersion of points, the less uncertain they are about the candidate's 
position. 
This representation of voter uncertainty is appealing for three reasons. First, unlike 
the measures of uncertainty advanced in the literature, this representation directly oper­
ationalizes uncertainty from the survey data, and does not infer a uncertainty measure 
from ancillary information about respondents.16 Second, this measure meshes closely 
with the theory of uncertainty discussed in the paper, which allows for rigorous tests of 
the hypothesis advanced about the role of uncertainty in presidential elections. Third, 
this measure can be applied to existing survey data, particularly the historical data from 
the National Election Studies, where there have been questions asking respondents to 
place candidates on policy scales since 1972. 
However, it is also important to note what this particular measure cannot do. One, 
unless repeated questions about the same policy issue are posed to the respondent, this 
measure cannot gauge uncertainty about specific issues. Instead, it is intended to measure 
more generally the uncertainty the voter has across .issues. Also, the accuracy of this 
measure will rely on the accuracy of the questions used to measure both the voter's own 
position on the issue, and even more importantly, the candidate's position on the issue. 
160ther indirect measures of uncertainty have been estimates by Bartels (1986), Campbell (1983) and 
Franklin (1991). Additionally, direct survey-based measures of policy uncertainty have been studied by 
Aldrich et al. (1982) and Alvarez and Franklin (1994). Unfortunately, none of the direct survey-based 
measures are available for the historical NES presidential election studies, other than the 1980 election 
(Alvarez 1992). 
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Table 1: Two-stage Probit Coefficients 
Coefficient Mean-Squared Errors 
Error Corr. 
- .95 
- .70 
- .60 
- .45 
- .20 
- .10 
0 
1.7789
0.2304 
0.0625 
0.0025
0 .0196 
0.0625 
0.0625
.10 0 .0576 
.20 0 .0144 
.45 0 .0025 
.60 0.0676 
.70 0 .2401 
.95 1.8225 
0 .5041 
0 .0676 
0 .0324 
0.0001 
0 .0025 
0 .0100 
0 .0064 
0 .0064 
0 .0049 
0.0025 
0 .0196 
0 .0625 
0.4489 
1.0201 
0.1296 
0.0441
0.0004 
0 .0121 
0 .0324 
0.0289 
0 .0289 
0 .0081 
0.0025 
0 .0400 
0.1296 
1.0201 
Note: These are the mean-squared error estimates of the 
coefficients from 1000 trials of a Monte Carlo simulation. 
of the 2SPLS technique 
Table 2: Two-stage CML Probit Coefficients 
Coefficient Mean-Squared Errors 
Error Corr. "Y f32 {33
-.95 0.1156 0 .0064 0 .0484 
- .70 0.0841 0 .0100 0.0484
- .60 0 .0961 0 .0100 0 .0400 
- .45 0 .0625 0 .0225 0.0441 
- .20 0 .0729 0 .0121 0.0441 
- .10 0.1024 0 .0196 0 .0576 
0 0 .0900 0 .0100 0 .0441 
.10 0 .0961 0 .0121 0.0484 
.20 0 .0576 0 .0169 0.0324 
.45 0.0784 0 .0121 0.0361 
.60 0.0729 0 .0169 0 .0400 
. .  70 0 .0729 . .0 .0196 .0 .0441 
.95 0 .0961 0 .0289 0 .0625 
Note: These are the mean-squared error estimates of the 
coefficients from 1000 trials of a Monte Carlo simulation. 
of the 2SCML technique 
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Table 3: Two-stage Least Squares Coefficients 
Coefficient Mean-Squared Errors 
Error Corr. 'Y /32 f33 
- .95 21 .996 0.0784 0.0000 
- .70 0. 7225 0.0064 0.0001 
- .60 0.2304 0 .0036 0 .0000 
-.45 0 .0529 0.0036 0.0001 
- .20 0.0025 0 .0036 0 .0000 
- . 10  0 .0001 0.0064 0.0001 
0 0.0016 0 .0009 0 .0000 
. 10 0.0004 0 .0049 0 .0001 
.20 0 .0009 0 .0036 0.0001 
.45 0.0484 0.0036 0.0000 
.60 0.2304 0 .0064 0 .0001 
.70 0.6724 0.0025 0.0001 
.95 23.426 0 . 1764 0.0004 
Note: These are the mean-squared error estimates of the 
coefficients from 1000 trials of a Monte Carlo simulation. 
of the 2PLS technique 
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Table 4: Two-stage Probit Standard Errors 
Estimated Relative to Actual SE 
Error Corr. <7-y <7{'2 <7133 
- .95 .86 . 77 .85 
- . 70 . 78 . 77 .81 
- .60 .81 . 77 . 75 
- .45 .83 . 79 . 78 
- .20 .83 .80 .82 
- .10 . 76 . 76 .81 
0 . 77 . 71 . 79 
. 1 0  . 77 . 79 .77 
.20 .84 .81 .84 
.45 .85 .85 .82 
.60 .88 .91 .89 
. 70 .96 .97 .95 
.95 1.09 1 .21 1.1 
Note: These are the quotients of the estimated coefficient 
standard errors relative to the actual standard errors of 
the coefficients from 1000 trials of a Monte Carlo simu- · 
lation of the 2SPLS technique 
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Table 5: Two-stage CML Standard Errors 
Estimated Relative to Actual SE 
Error Corr. I u "'f u f32 u f33
- .95 . 71 .53 .58 
- . 70 . 73 .68 .74 
- .60 . 79 . 69 . 73 
- .45 .84 . 75 . 78 
-.20 . 78 . 78 .80 
- .10 .75 .72 .77 
0 .77 .82 .78 
.10 .76 .78 .73 
.20 .84 .81 .83 
.45 . 77 .79 .81 
.60 .81 .84 .83 
. 70 .88 .89 .85 
.95 . 78 .82 .76 
Note: These are the quotients of the estimated coefficient 
standard errors relative to the actual standard errors of 
the coefficients from 1000 trials of a Monte Carlo simu-· 
lation of the 2SCML technique 
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Table 6: Two-stage LS Standard Errors 
Estimated Relative to Actual SE 
Error Corr. u'Y Uf32 Uf33
- .95 .08 .09 . 10 
- .70 .15 .19 .19 
- .6.0 . 16 .20 .21 
- .45 . 17  .22 .23 
- .20 . 19  .24 .25 
- . 10  . 19 .24 .26 
0 .21 .27 .26 
. 10  .20 .25 .26 
.20 .20 .25 .26 
.45 . 18 .25 .26 
.60 . 19 .24 .24 
.70 . 19 .23 .23 
.95 .03 .03 .12 
Note: These are the quotients of the estimated coefficient 
standard errors relative to the actual standard errors of 
the coefficients from 1000 trials of a Monte Carlo simu-· 
lation of the 2PLS technique 
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Table 7: Two-Stage Uncertainty Results, 1976 Election 
Carter and Ford Uncertainty 
Independent Carter Ford 
Variables Uncertainty U nce�tainty 
Constant 5.5** 5 . 1** 
0.89 0.87 
Education -0.28** -0.29**
0 . 14 0 .14 
Political -0 .28** -0.25**
Information 0.04 0 .04 
Gender 0 .65** 0 .78** 
0.24 0.24 
Race 0.24 0 .46 
0.49 0.49 
Partisan 0 .12 0 .06 
Strength 0 .15 0 .15 
Media -0 . 14** -0 .22**
Exposure 0 .06 0.06 
Political -0.06** -0 .03*
Efficacy 0.03 0 .03 
First Debate 0.004 -0.25*
0 .17  0 .17 
Second Debate -0 .22* -0 . 13 
0 . 16  0 . 16  
Candidate -0 . 17  -0.49*
Advertising 0.37 0.35 
Candidate -0 .08** 0.02 
Preference 0.03 0 .03 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 
Model S.E. 2.6 2.7 
Uncertainty mean 3.9 3.8 
number of cases 464 464 
Entries are two-stage least squares estimates, and their associated ad­
justed standard errors. * indicates a p:::U.10 level of statistical signifi­
cance, and ** a p=0.05 level, both one-tailed tests. 
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Table 8: Two-Stage Voting Models, 1976 Election 
Probability of Carter Support 
Independent 2SCML 2SPLS 
Variables Estimates Estimates 
Constant 1.58** 1. 71 **
0.91 0 .91 
Ford Issue 0.18** 0 .18** 
Distance 0.08 0 .08 
Carter Issue -0.10* -0.11 * 
Distance 0.07 0.07 
Ford 0 .66* 0 .68* 
Uncertainty 0.51 0 .51 
Carter -0.75* -0 .77*
Uncertainty 0.55 0.55 
Ford -0.40** -0.39** 
Traits 0 .05 0 .05 
Carter 0 .33** 0 .33** 
Traits 0 .06 0 .06 
Party -0.29** -0.29** 
Identification 0 .07 0.07 
Education -0.40** -0 .39** 
0.18 0 .18 
Gender -0.35 -0.34 
0 .31 0.30 
Ford Error -0.61 
0 .53 
Carter Error 0 .64 
0 .56 
% Correct 95.3 95.7 
x2 699.8 697.6 
number of cases 464 464 
Note: Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates, and their associated 
asymptotic standard errors. * indicates a p=0 .10 level of statistical
significance, and ** a p=0.05 level, both one-tailed tests. 2SCML is 
the River-Vuong conditional- maximum likelihood model; 2SPLS is the 
limited-iriforma.tion probit and least squares model. Candidate uncer­
tainty in the 2SPLS model are instruments from a reduced form regres­
sion; the Ford and Carter error indicators are the error terms from the 
same regression. 
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Table 9: Reduced Form Probit Model, 1976 Election 
Probability of Carter Vote 
Independent 
Variables 
Constant 0.04 
1 . 1  
Education -0.43 
0 .16 
Partisan 0.51 
Strength 0.16 
Gender -0.4 
0.28 
Race 2.4 
2.5 
Political -0.01 
Information 0.05 
Political -0.009 
Efficacy 0.03 
Media 0.01 
Exposure 0.06 
Ford Ad -0.57 
0 .39 
Carter Ad 0.05 
0 .39 
First -0.07 
Debate 0.19 
Second -0.14 
Debate 0.18 
Ford Issue 0.29 
Distance 0.08 
Carter Issue -0 .26 
Distance 0.07 
Ford Traits -0.46 
0.06 
Carter Traits 0.41 
0.06 
- - % Correct - 95.7 
x2 697.8 
Entries are probit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated stan­
dard errors . 
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Table 10: Summary Statistics for Variables in 1976 Voting Models 
Independent Variables 
Variable Mean S. Dev. Min. Max 
Ford Issue Distance 5 .60 2.63 0.50 12. 7 
Carter Issue Distance 5.21 2.33 0.84 12.5 
Ford Uncertainty 3.96 3 .03 0.23 13 .8 
Carter Uncertainty 4.08 3.07 0 .19 13.2 
Ford Traits 12.0 5.46 3.51 24.6 
Carter Traits 10.8 4 .70 3.38 23.7 
Party Identification 3.36 2.16 1.0 7 .0 
Education 2.62 0.87 1.0 4.0 
Gender 0 .54 0.50 0 1 
Ford Error -0.18 2.66 -7.45 8 .53 
Carter Error -0.14 2.67 -7.19 8.06 
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Table 11: Reduced Form Models for 1976 Uncertainty Variables 
Candidate Uncertainty 
Independent Ford Carter 
Variables Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Constant 5.02 5.34 
0.88 0.87 
Education -0.29 -0.32 
0.14 0.13 
Party Strength 0.008 0.02 
0.13 0.12 
Gender 0 .72 0.56 
0.22 0.22 
Political -0.32 -0.33 
Information 0.04 0.04 
Media -0.25 -0.17 
Exposure 0.05 0.05 
Political -0.02 -0.04 
Efficacy 0.02 0.02 
Race 0.80 0.25 
0.44 0.44 
Candidate -0.50 -0.12 
Advertisement 0.29 0.31 
First -0.17 0.02 
Debate 0.16 0 .15 
Second -0.14 -0.20 
Debate 0.15 0.15 
Ford Traits -0.01 0.02 
0.02 0.02 
Carter Traits -0.01 -0.08 
0.03 0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.26 
Model S.E. 2.77 2.75 
Uncertainty Mean 4.17 4.14 
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Note: This gives the simulated probabilities of candi­
date support across the ranges of uncertainty about each 
candidate in the 1976 election. The coefficients these cal­
culations are based upon are in Table 8 .  
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